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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1988, President George Bush of the United States and Presi-
dent Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico have moved with unex-
pected speed toward establishing a new friendship to ensure a richer
life for the citizens of both countries., The two leaders have made
progress on matters which historically have been a source of ten-
sion.2 Mexico and the United States have cooperatively addressed
1. See Martin Shupack, Human Rights and the United States-Mexico Free Trade Agree-
ment, 4 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 163, 163 (1991); President George Bush, Toasts at the
State Dinner for President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico (Oct. 3, 1989), in
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc., Oct. 9, 1989, at 1499. Ambassador Carla Hills testified
before the Subcommittee on Trade: "When Presidents Bush and Salinas took office
18 months ago, who would have imagined that U.S.-Mexican trade relations would
have come so far so fast." United States-Mexico Economic Relations: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 47, 49
(1990) (testimony of Ambassador Carla A. Hills) [hereinafter Hills Testimony].
2. See Shupack, supra note 1, at 163. According to two critics, "from the very
beginning, relations between both countries have been tainted by conflicting inter-
ests, differing conceptual points of view, misunderstandings, clashing passions, and
even violence." Alejandro Ogarrio & Leonel Pereznieto Castro, Mexico-United States
Relations: Economic Integration and Foreign Investment, 12 Hous. J. Irr'L L. 223, 226
(1990). The United States-Mexico relationship has experienced many strains. See
Abelardo L. Valdez, Strengthening the United States-Mexico Relation: A Proposal for Estab-
lishing a Free-Trade Zone and Co-Production Zone, 18 CAL. W. Irr'L L.J. 65, 65 (1987-88).
"A variety of issues-immigration, narcotics trafficking, foreign investment, trade,
1
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issues such as trade and investment,3 debt reduction,4 drugs,5 and
the environment.6 In addition, extensive economic reform in Mex-
ico has fostered U.S.-Mexican economic integration. 7 The escalation
and foreign policy (especially relating to Central America) have generated a barrage
of rhetoric and negative reaction between both nations." Id.
Recently, however, U.S.-Mexican relations have improved. See Robert B. Zoel-
lick, North American Free Trade Agreement; Extending Fast-Track Negotiating Au-
thority, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Apr. 11, 1991),
in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, Apr. 15, 1991, at 254.
Specifically, in April 1990, the United States and Mexico established the United
States-Mexico Coordinating Committee to function as a forum for both governments
to address issues and opportunities for advancing their bilateral relationship. Fact
Sheet: Joint Communique of the U.S.-Mexico Coordinating Committee (Apr. 26,
1991), in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, Apr. 29, 1991, at 305. The Coordinating
Committee meets regularly to supplement the two countries' Binational Commis-
sion, which meets only annually. The Coordinating Committee reviews the progress
of the 11 Binational Commission working groups. The working groups are active in
key areas of U.S.-Mexican relations: bilateral as well as other international issues,
border affairs, migration, the environment, trade, investment, commercial and finan-
cial cooperation, agriculture, fisheries and maritime matters, legal affairs, anti-narcot-
ics cooperation, labor cooperation, and educational and cultural relations. This
variety of working groups and issues is evidence of the common interest of the two
governments in strengthening relations in all areas and maintaining a constructive
dialogue. Id.
3. The Trade and Investment Facilitations Talks, which built on the 1987
Framework Understanding on Trade and Investment, was signed in October 1989.
See Hills Testimony, supra note 1, at 50. This agreement provides a mechanism to
negotiate specific trade and investment issues or sectors. Id.; see also Guy C. Smith,
The United States-Mexico Framework Agreement: Implications for Bilateral Trade, 20 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 655, 655-81 (1989).
4. See Hills Testimony, supra note 1, at 51. In 1989, the United States and Mex-
ico reached a new debt accord under the Brady Plan. Id.
5. See Fact Sheet: Mexican Initiatives and Cooperation with the United States, in
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, Apr. 15, 1991, at 265 [hereinafter Fact Sheet]; U.S.,
Mexico Set Anti-Drug Pact, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1990, at A9. The United States agreed
to provide Mexico with nine armed helicopters for drug enforcement activities. Id.
In addition, the United States and Mexico reached a reciprocal agreement that per-
mits Mexican Federal Judicial Police to investigate drug cases in the United States
and allows Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents to do the same in Mexico. See
Kevin McCauley, Mexico Difficult Client for Three U.S. PR Firms, PR SERVICES, Aug.
1990, at 1 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Currnt file).
6. See Fact Sheet, supra note 5, at 265-66; see also Daniel I. Basturto Gonzalez &
Elaine Flud Rodriguez, Environmental Aspects of the Maquiladora Operations: A Note of
Caution for U.S. Parent Corporations, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 659, 678-80 (noting recent U.S.-
Mexican cooperation on environmental issues).
7. See Guy C. Smith, The United States-Mexico Framework Agreement: Implications for
Bilateral Trade, 20 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 655, 660-63 (1989); see also Ogarrio & Cas-
tro, supra note 2, at 225-29 (discussing the history and extent of U.S.-Mexican eco-
nomic integration).
"For forty years following the end of World War II, Mexico pursued inward-
looking and protectionist economic policies." See Terry Wu & Neil Longley, A U.S.
Mexico Free Trade Agreement: U.S. Perspectives,J. WORLD TRADE,June 1991, at 5, 6. The
government sought to industrialize with a strategy of substituting Mexican products
[Vol. 18
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of cooperation has culminated in the recent proposal to completely
eliminate restrictions on bilateral trade,8 moving the United States
and Mexico toward full economic integration.9
In June 1990, Presidents Bush and Salinas directed their adminis-
trations to work for the establishment of a "comprehensive" free
trade agreement.10 The contemplated agreement would provide for
the full, phased elimination of import tariffs; the elimination or ful-
lest possible reduction of non-tariff trade barriers, such as import
quotas, licenses and technical barriers to trade; the establishment
of clear binding protection for intellectual property rights; fair and
expeditious dispute settlement procedures; and means to improve
and expand the flow of goods, services, and investment between
the United States and Mexico.1
According to the Bush and Salinas administrations, a free trade
agreement would help "forge a vigorous partnership for sustained
economic growth and opportunity" between Mexico and the United
States.12 For the United States, free trade would provide greater ac-
cess to a growing Mexican market,'3 thus benefiting the United
for imports. Luis Rubio, Mexico in Perspective.- An Essay on Mexico's Economic Reform and
Political Consequences, 12 Hous.J. INT'L L. 235, 235 (1990). Under this strategy, Mex-
ico experienced three decades of rapid economic growth. Wu & Longley, supra, at 6.
Inward-looking economic policies, however, also led to extensive inefficiency and a
lack of competitiveness in many sectors of Mexico's economy. With the discovery of
oil in the 1970s, followed by the subsequent decline in world oil prices in the 1980s
and the severe debt crisis of 1982, Mexico began to restructure its economy. It em-
barked on a course of ambitious economic reform. Id. Injuly of 1986, Mexico joined
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), reflecting a fundamental shift
from protectionism to trade liberalization. Id. at 7.
President Salinas has continued the reform since he took office in 1988. Id. at 6;
see also Mark C. O'Brien & Carlos Muggenburg, Salinastroika: Recent Developments in
Technology Transfer Law in Mexico, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 753, 777 (1991). Under Salinas'
new economic policies, the Mexican government has privatized many state-owned
enterprises, reduced maximum tariff rates from 100% to an average of 20%, elimi-
nated restrictive import licensing on 80% of import items, actively encouraged for-
eign investment in Mexican business, and approved 100% foreign ownership in
various sectors. See Wu & Longley, supra, at 6-7.
8. See Mexico-United States Joint Statement on Negotiation of a Free Trade
Agreement (June 11, 1990), in 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 933, June 11, 1990, at
933 [hereinafter Joint Statement].
9. Id.; see also William A. Orme, Economic Integration of North America is a Fait Ac-
compli, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 18, 1991, at 6 (predicting that a free trade agreement,
which will "simply formalize" the ongoing process of business-driven integration,
could be completed by the spring of 1992).
10. Joint Statement, supra note 8, at 933.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Hills Testimony, supra note 1, at 52. The Bush Administration expects free
trade to fuel the economic growth in Mexico created by President Salinas' economic
reforms. See GIST: North American Free Trade Agreement (June 24, 1991), in U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, June 24, 1991, at 454 [hereinafter GIST]. In addition,
19921
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States through increased employment opportunities,14 increased ex-
ports of high technology products and services,15 expanded invest-
ment opportunities,16 an increased variety of goods available to
American consumers;1 7 and lower prices to American consumers for
labor-intensive goods.18 In addition, observers expect free trade to
produce substantial benefits for Mexico.19
Although analysts do not dispute the overall positive economic im-
Mexico's economic growth has increased the size of Mexico's middle class in propor-
tion to the total population, which means more consumers for American products.
Id.; see also Matilde K. Stephenson, Mexico's Maquiladora Program: Challenges and Pros-
pects, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 589, 594-96 (1991) (discussing Mexico's recent economic
growth).
14. Zoellick, supra note 2, at 257-59. "All three major economic analyses done to
date corroborate that the United States will benefit from a NAFTA [North American
Free Trade Agreement] in exports, output, and employment." President George
Bush, North American Free Trade Agreement (May 1, 1991), in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE
DISPATCH, May 6, 1991, at 318 [hereinafter Response] (summarizing executive report
entitled "Response to Issues Raised in Connection With the Negotiation of a North
American Free Trade Agreement"). An outside study prepared for the Department
of Labor found that free trade with Mexico will "add between 44,500 jobs over 5
years and 64,000 jobs over 10 years, the bulk of them in manufacturing." Zoellick,
supra note 2, at 259; see also Wu & Longley, supra note 7, at 13.
15. See President Bush, Fast Track and Trade Opportunities, Address Before the
Hispanic Free Trade Breakfast (Apr. 8, 1991) in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, Apr.
15, 1991, at 253; Wu & Longley, supra note 7, at 13.
16. Hills Testimony, supra note 1, at 52; see also Wu & Longley, supra note 7, at
10-11.
17. Hills Testimony, supra note 1, at 52.
18. Id.
19. Analysts and officials believe that a free trade agreement may produce even
greater benefits for Mexico than for the United States. See Mordechai E. Kreinin,
North American Economic Integration, law & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1981, at 7, 27,
30; David B. Hidgins, Comment, Mexico's 1989 Foreign Investment Regulations: A Signifi-
cant Step Forward, But Is It Enough?, 12 Hous.J. Irr'L L. 361, 380 (1990). For instance,
Mexican officials believe that free trade with the United States will help attract for-
eign capital and spur modernization. Clyde H. Farnsworth, Mexican Free Trade Pact
Pushed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1990, at DI.
Moreover, observers note that free trade between the United States and Mexico
will advance long term economic growth and stability in Mexico. See William H. Cav-
itt, New Elements in the Anti-Dumping Equation: Implementing GA TT Uruguay Round, U.S. -
Mexico Free Trade Negotiations, 17 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 23, 23-25 (1991); Wu & Longley, supra
note 7, at 12; H. Eugene Douglas, Remarks Before the Conference: Mexico and the United
States, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 5, 8, 12 (1987).
If U.S. tariffs and barriers are removed under a free trade agreement with Mex-
ico, "one could expect a substantial expansion of manufacturing exports from Mex-
ico to the United States." Kreinin, supra, at 27. A large percentage of the increase in
exports would be in labor-intensive products, such as textiles, clothing, leather
goods, and lumber products. Because Mexico has a comparative advantage with
these products, its economy should realize sizeable gains in terms of expanded out-
put, increased employment and improved efficiency. Id.
In addition, economic growth in Mexico in turn spurs economic growth in the
United States. See Zoellick, supra note 2, at 254. About 15 cents of every dollar of
[Vol. 18
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pact of U.S.-Mexican free trade,20 some do not support the complete
removal of restrictions on trade between the two countries.21 Critics
in the United States, including officials representing organized labor,
have raised concerns about the potential harm to American work-
ers. 22 Critics are concerned that American jobs will be lost and, in
effect, transferred to Mexico, where labor costs are considerably
lower.23 Free trade may redistribute income in the United States
away from unskilled and semi-skilled labor toward professional and
technical labor and capital.24 The potential losers in the income re-
Mexican growth is spent on U.S. goods. Id. at 256-57. Thus, as Mexico grows, it
imports more and creates export opportunities for U.S. firms. Id. at 257.
20. See Zoellick, supra note 2, at 256-57; Hills Testimony, supra note 1, at 52; Wu
& Longley, supra note 7, at 12. "Trade between the United States and Mexico cur-
rently amounts to $60 billion per year. That figure is expected to rise rapidly, possi-
bly to $120 billion per year if and when the two nations enter into an agreement that
eliminates most tariffs and other barriers to trade." Barbara Bader Aldave, Toward
Freer Trade and More Commerce Between the United States and Mexico, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J.,
579, 580 (1991).
In addition to bilateral trade opportunities, analysts also emphasize that the
United States and Mexico stand to gain in world markets by forming a cooperative
trading bloc. See, e.g., Wu & Longley, supra note 7, at 13. To enhance the leverage
and efficiency in world market competition, the United States and Mexico have wel-
comed the addition of Canada to the free trade negotiations. Id.; see also President
Bush, North American Free Trade Agreement, Joint Statement Issued by the United
States, Canada, and Mexico (Feb. 5, 1991), in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, Feb. 11,
1991, at 96
21. See John B. Rehm, Possible Negotiation of a U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 4
CAN.-U.S. Bus. L.R. 273, 274 (1991); Wu & Longley, supra note 7, at 6; Larry Rohter,
U.S. and Mexicans Cautiously Back Free-Trade Idea, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1990, at Al.
22. See The North American Free Trade Agreement: Hearings Before the Subcomms. on In-
ternat'l Economic Policy and Trade and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 140, 141 (1991) (testimony of William J. Cun-
ningham, Legislative Representative, AFL-CIO) [hereinafter NAFTA Hearings].
23. Id.; United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 114, 114-17 (1991) (prepared statement of Thomas
Donahue, Secretary and Treasurer, AFL-CIO); see also Lane Kirkland, Free Trade With
Mexico Would Be a Disasterfor Workers, L.A. DAILYJ., Apr. 26, 1991, at 6 (Lane Kirkland
is the current President of the AFL-CIO). The "maquiladora" program in Mexico
enables United States firms to set up factories in Mexico and export back to the
United States with minimal duty charges. Kirkland views this program as a miniature
U.S.-Mexico free trade agreement. Id.
In the past decade, under the maquiladora program, hundreds of U.S. firms have
shut down factories in the United States and moved them to Mexico. The U.S. firms
are lured by Mexico's comparative advantage of "rock-bottom" wages and lack of
effective government regulations and enforcement. These relocations have resulted
in the loss of hundreds of thousands of American jobs. Id. A free trade agreement
with Mexico will "mean the loss of many blue-collar jobs in the United States. Due to
Mexico's abundant supply of cheap unskilled labor, it is expected that such manufac-
turing sectors as textiles, apparel, shoes and auto parts will have significant produc-
tion facilities moved to Mexico." Wu & Longley, supra note 7, at 12.
24. See Robert M. Dunn, Jr., Low-Paid Workers Would Lose Even More in Free-Trade
1992]
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distribution process-American workers and families supported by
import-sensitive jobs-need protection from the new competition
with Mexico.25 This Note presents a strategy to minimize the ad-
verse consequences on American workers by conditioning free trade
on respect for worker rights.
II. PREVENTING AMERICAN WORKER DISLOCATION
A strategy to minimize the adverse consequences on American
workers from U.S.-Mexican free trade will be most effective if it can
prevent adverse consequences from occurring in the first place. This
Note therefore focuses on a preventative course of action. One of
the primary adverse consequences of free trade is worker disloca-
tion. 26 Import competition from Mexico threatens American work-
ers because labor costs in Mexico are substantially lower than labor
costs in the United States. 2 7 Hence, in a free trade environment,
Pact with Mexico, WASH. POST., Aug. 1, 1990, at F3; Kreinin, supra note 19, at 27.
Increased Mexican imports will result in a shifting of "U.S. labor and capital from the
import-competing to the export industries." Id. "By implication this is a shift of
resources from labor intensive to capital intensive industries, which would increase
the overall efficiency of the U.S. economy." Id.
25. See Wu & Longley, supra note 7, at 6. The Bush Administration has down-
played the American job-loss issue by emphasizing the job-creating potential of free
trade. See Zoellick, supra note 2, at 257-59. In addition, the Administration suggests
that, in the aggregate, jobs will not necessarily be lost, but that "reduction of remain-
ing US barriers to competition would require adjustment by US firms and workers .
. . ." Id. at 258 (emphasis added). The Administration also argues that the scope of
the "adjustment" will be insignificant since the Mexican economy is only about four
percent of the size of the U.S. economy. Id. Finally, the Administration contends
that job changes can be "expedited and eased" through the financial assistance of the
Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act. Id.
The U.S. Congress has been more receptive to concerns about the possible neg-
ative effects free trade would have on some U.S. sectors and on workers. A congres-
sional resolution introduced on October 1, 1990, called for a "thorough assessment"
of the impact of a free trade agreement on U.S. manufacturing and wages. See H.R.
CON. RES. 377, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 3 (1990); see also H.R. REP. No. 63, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 2-4 (1991) (discussing the negative effects that free trade
will have on the U.S. labor force).
26. Dislocation of workers can occur when increased competition forces a firm to
either shut down or make technological changes that reduce the labor input of their
products. Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100
HARV. L. REV. 546, 620 (1987). In either situation, workers are forced to "adjust" by
finding employment elsewhere. Id. at 621. Job loss creates initial income losses, and
often workers cannot obtain other positions in the same industry. Id. As a result, a
worker may be unemployed for an extended period, or be compelled to find work
outside the field in which the worker was trained. Id.
27. "According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average wage rate in Mex-
ico is only 16 percent of the average U.S. wage rate." H.R. REP. No. 63, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 11 (statement by Representative David Dreier); see also United States-
Mexico Free Trade Agreement: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess., at 123 (1991) (prepared statement of Rudiger Dornbusch, Professor of Eco-
[Vol. 18
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Mexican firms operate with a comparative advantage28 in labor costs,
making their labor-intensive products more competitive.29 Labor-in-
tensive industries in the United States would likely suffer if they were
forced to compete with "cheap" Mexican labor.3O
Labor costs are lower in Mexico not because Mexican workers are
more productive,31 but because of other factors which bear on labor
costs. Most observers recognize that the main reason for the dispar-
ity in U.S. and Mexican labor costs is the difference in the extent of
development and the resulting fact that Mexican workers can accept
lower wages and still maintain their standard of living.32 But another
significant reason that labor costs are lower in Mexico is the addi-
tional costs to U.S. employers associated with laborers' working con-
ditions.~3 Generally, U.S. firms invest more in the working
conditions of their laborers than Mexican firms do.34 As a result,
nomics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology comparing U.S. and Mexican labor
wages).
28. Comparative advantage is an economic doctrine first announced by David
Ricardo in 1817. The doctrine states that whenever countries have relative produc-
tion strengths, they will benefit from trade with each other if each specializes in the
production of the goods in which it has the advantage. DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION, VII (1817). The doctrine of comparative ad-
vantage is "a powerful intellectual underpinning" of free trade theory. JOHN H. JACK-
SON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 11 (1989).
29. See Kreinin, supra note 19, at 27 (stating that Mexico has a comparative ad-
vantage in labor intensive products and that free trade would encourage Mexico to
increase exports of these products to the United States).
30. See id.; Wu & Longley, supra note 7, at 12-13 (stating that a free trade agree-
ment would result in the loss of many blue-collar jobs in the U.S.); Zoellick, supra
note 2, at 258 (admitting that the reduction of U.S. trade barriers would require
"adjustment" by U.S. firms and workers).
31. The 1988 labor statistics show that the value of output in the United States
was $45,927 per worker, while the value of output per Mexican worker was only
$6,472, about 14% of U.S. worker output. H.R. REP. No. 63, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1., at 11 (1991) (statement by Representative David Dreier).
32. See PETER H. LINDERT & CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOM-
ICS 33-34 (7th ed. 1984) (explaining that a country with less expensive factors of
production has a comparative advantage in international trade).
33. See Kirkland, supra note 23, at 6; H.R. REP. No. 63, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
1, at 2 (1991); AFL-CIO Official Blasts Proposed FTA In Testimony Before Senate Finance
Committee, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. 232 (Feb. 13, 1991); NAFTA Hearings, supra note 22, at
91-95 (prepared statement of Pharis Harvey, Executive Director, International Labor
Rights Education and Research Fund).
34. The costs U.S. firms bear to maintain safe, nonexploitive working conditions,
mandated by U.S. health, safety and labor laws, reduce the international competitive-
ness of United States products. See Mastering the World Economy: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1987) (testimony of Lane Kirk-
land, President, AFL-CIO); Susanna Peters, Labor Law for the Maquiladoras: Choosing
Between Workers' Rights and Foreign Investment, 11 COMP. LA L.J. 226, 235- 45 (1990).
1992]
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labor-intensive goods produced in the United States cost more than
similar Mexican goods.
In the long term, Mexico's comparative advantage can be dimin-
ished only by narrowing the difference between the two countries'
standards of living. Nonetheless, two principal alternatives exist in
the short term to reduce Mexico's advantage: either American work-
ers could accept less in terms of working conditions or Mexican
workers could be afforded better working conditions. Although the
former would nullify Mexico's labor advantage, it would not prevent
voluntary worker dislocation. For U.S. industries to remain competi-
tive, American workers might face reductions in workplace condi-
tions, perhaps through a combination of lower wages, longer hours,
and lessened workplace safety. This will cause American workers
who are unable or unwilling to accept lower standards in the work-
place to become "dislocated" even though their jobs still exist.
The latter suggestion, raising Mexican working conditions closer
to those in the United States, also poses problems. Certainly, direct
unilateral action by the United States or by U.S. firms to force Mexi-
can firms to improve working conditions for their workers is not fea-
sible.a5 The United States could, however, indirectly limit the
advantage that Mexican firms gain through perpetuating substan-
dard working conditions. For example, allowing unrestricted access
to the U.S. market only to Mexican traders whose goods are pro-
duced under reasonable working conditions would indirectly reduce
Mexico's labor advantage.36 Because this alternative could counter
Mexico's comparative advantage, it offers potential for preventing
the dislocation of American workers.
The next section of this Note evaluates the appropriateness of con-
ditioning international trade on working conditions. This Note then
argues that the most effective means of addressing Mexican working
conditions is not through U.S. unilateral trade sanctions, but
through through bilateral means such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement presently being negotiated between the United
States, Mexico and Canada.
III. SUPPRESSED LABOR CONDITIONS AS "UNFAIR TRADE"
The link between labor conditions and international economic
competition is premised on the notion that all laborers possess fun-
35. Direct action against Mexico or Mexican firms to force improvements in
working conditions would, of course, infringe on Mexico's sovereignty. See generally
L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 123-24, at 286-88 (8th ed. 1955). A sovereign
state, its powers vested in the government, wields ultimate authority over its subjects
and may act as it sees fit within its borders. See id. § 123, at 286.
36. See infra notes 57-93 and accompanying text (evaluating U.S. precedent for
conditioning trade on the other country's respect for worker rights).
[Vol. 18
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damental rights.5 7 Such rights center around a worker's interest in
being free from exploitative or dangerous workplace conditions.38
Denial or suppression of these basic rights is objectionable in a
human rights context as well as in an international trade context.3 9
According to those who advocate linking labor rights to international
trade, the predominant goal of these efforts is humanitarian.40 Link-
ing labor rights to trade aims to improve laborers' working condi-
tions and rights world-wide.41 Specifically focusing on preventing
37. See Kevin Hickey, Note, Connecting Trade and International Labor Standards: De-
nial of Worker Rights as an Unfair Trade Practice, 6 LAw & INEQ. J. 127, 127-28 (1988);
Theresa A. Amato, Note, Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation and
the International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 80 (1990). The International La-
bour Organization (ILO), founded in 1919 and now a specialized agency of the
United Nations, defines fundamental labor rights through internationally ratified
conventions. As the International Labour Conference, the policy-making body of the
ILO, declared in 1944 that "all human beings, irrespective of race, creed, or sex,
have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual develop-
ment in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security, and equal opportu-
nity." EDMUND JAN OSMANCZYK, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 409 (2d ed. 1990).
38. See OSMANCZYK, supra note 37, at 409. The ILO, working to establish interna-
tional labor standards, generally addresses the following issues: (1) hours of work,
including a maximum working day and week; (2) the regulation of the labor supply
and the prevention of unemployment; (3) the provision of an adequate living wage;
(4) the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his
employment; (5) the protection of the interests of workers when employed in coun-
tries other than their own; (6) recognition of the principle of equal remuneration for
work of equal value; (7) recognition of the principle of freedom of association; and
(8) technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. Id.
39. Human rights advocates contend that violations of labor rights are "morally
wrong." Harlan Mandel, Note, In Pursuit of the Missing Link: International Worker Rights
andInternational Trade?, 27 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 443, 455 (1989). For many years,
human rights advocates have sought to curtail the proliferation of human rights vio-
lations occurring in the work place. Amato, supra note 37, at 79. In spite of their
efforts, however, horrendous workplace human rights violations continue to occur
worldwide. See Hickey, supra note 37, at 127-28 (providing examples of child ex-
ploitation, dangerous work conditions, and denial of livable wages).
40. See supra note 39.
41. Representative Donald Pease (Democrat, Ohio), the House sponsor of the
worker rights provisions in the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) and section
301, stated that "trade is not and should not be viewed as an end in itself. Fair
competition in world trade should renounce labor repression and it should be struc-
tured by rule and in practice to improve the living standards of workers as well as
manufacturers and consumers." 133 CONG. REC. H1498 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1987); see
also 131 CONG. REC. HI 1,674 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1985) (noting that Overseas Private
Investment Corporation may operate only in countries that implement basic worker
rights legislation); Workers' Rights and Trade Adjustment Assistance Programs: Hearing on S.
490 and H.R. 3 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1987)
(statement of Howard D. Samuel, President, Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO);
Frank A. Hirsch, Jr., Note, Renewal of the GSP: An Explanation of the Program and Changes
Made by the 1984 Legislation, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 625, 656-57 (1985).
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harm to American workers, this Note evaluates the propriety of link-
ing trade to working conditions only in terms of international trade
norms.
A. The "Fair Trade"Justification for Linking Labor Conditions to Trade
The main trade-related justification for insisting that an interna-
tional trading partner preserve fundamental worker rights is the "fair
trade" justification.42 The fair trade justification essentially main-
tains that conditioning access to a domestic market on a country's
respect for worker rights is justified because suppression of worker
rights is not an acceptable means of gaining an international trading
advantage.4 3
Two tenets underlie the fair trade justification.44 The first tenet
recognizes that international trade is distorted by a phenomenon
known as "social dumping."45 Social dumping involves a violation
42. See Mandel, supra note 39, at 452; Steve Charnovitz, Fair Labor Standards and
International Trade, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 61, 72-74 (1986); see also Don J. Pease &
William Goold, The New GSP Fair Trade with the Third World, 2 WORLD POL'v J. 351,
356 (1985).
43. See Charnovitz, supra note 42, at 74; Mandel, supra note 39, at 452-54; see also
H.R. 1735, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(1)-(3) (1987) (findings and policy statement
of bill preceding the enactment of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988). The findings of this legislation include:
[E]xploitation of workers is an unacceptable means for any country or indus-
try to gain competitive advantage in international trade; labor repression
has become an important unfair trading practice used against the United
States; and exports from countries that deny internationally recognized
worker rights undermine living and working standards in both developing
countries and the United States, because international corporations play
workers off against one another to minimize costs.
Hickey, supra note 37, at 142 (footnotes omitted).
44. Mandel, supra note 39, at 452.
45. Id.; see also Trade Reform Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the
Comm. on Ways and Means, 99rH CONG., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 8 (1986) (statement by John
Cavanagh, Fellow, Institute for Policy Studies and Co-Coordinator, International La-
bor Rights Working Group); Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour
Standards on the World Trading Regime, A Historical Overview, 126 INT'L LAB. REV. 565,
566 (1987) [hereinafter, Charnovitz, Influence].
Generally, "dumping" is defined as the sale of goods to an international trading
partner at a price lower than fair market value (usually considered to be the price of
the goods sold in its home market), thereby injuring a trading partner's domestic
industry. Peter Huston, Note, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Dispute Settlement
Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Is the Process Constitutional?, 23 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 529, 529 (1990); General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, opened for
signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, A23-A25, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 212, 214, 216 [here-
inafter GATT].
Social dumping refers to the international sale of products made by a labor force
that has been denied fundamental labor rights. See Charnovitz, Influence, supra, at 566.
Applied to labor exploitation, the term dumping is a misnomer in that it
incorrectly suggests a discrepancy between the market price of goods sold in
the [trading partner's market] and those sold in the home market. The
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of worker rights in order to gain an international trade advantage.46
When a government suppresses labor unions and depresses labor
conditions in order to support export sectors and attract foreign in-
vestment, it is engaging in social dumping.47 All else being equal,
suppressing worker rights lowers production costs and results in an
unfairly obtained price advantage, which, in turn, results in discrimi-
nation against goods produced under labor conditions respectful of
worker rights.48
The second tenet of the "fair trade" justification recognizes that
violating worker rights causes injury to workers in countries compet-
ing with the violator.49 International competition has the effect of
harmonizing labor conditions and wages as manufacturers are at-
tracted to countries with permissive regulatory laws and low stan-
dards.50 Suppression of labor conditions and wages in one country
thus lowers labor conditions and wages in countries throughout the
world.5t
Suppression of worker rights constitutes an unfair trade practice
since it injures competing countries' industries and workers. A com-
peting country, therefore, has the right to provide relief from the
unfair trade practice by taking action to negate it.52 Essentially, the
fair trade justification treats the suppression of worker rights as a
form of trade subsidy.53 "Where a traditional form of trade subsidy
might lower the cost of a manufacturer's raw materials or tax burden,
suppressing labor rights lowers the cost of a manufacturer's la-
goods are costlier in the home market, not in terms of price, but in terms of
the "exploitation" borne by the laborers.
Amato, supra note 37, at 83 n.21.
46. See Charnovitz, supra note 42, at 566; Mandel, supra note 39, at 452.
47. See Mandel, supra note 39, at 452.
48. See Amato, supra note 37, at 82. See also Workers' Rights & Trade Adjustment
Programs: Hearings on S. 490 and H.R. 3 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 100TH CONG.,
1st Sess. 23, 24 (1987) (statement of Senator Harkin).
49. Mandel, supra note 39, at 452-54; Charnovitz, supra note 42, at 72.
Charnovitz cites the International Labour Organization Constitution of 1919, which
states that "the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an
obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their
countries." Id.
50. See John M. Culbertson, A Realist View of International Trade and National Trade
Policy, 18 N.Y.U.J. Irr'L L. & POL. 1119, 1124-30 (1986); Mandel, supra note 39, at
452-54. International Fair Labor Standards (IFLS) should address the harmonizing
effect that competition has on labor law. Charnovitz, supra note 41, at 72.
51. Mandel, supra note 39, at 453.
52. Id. Although GAIT does not directly address labor laws, it can be the basis
for relief to states which unfair trade practices have injured. See GATT, supra note 45,
61 Stat. at A23-A25, A51-A52, A64-A65, 55 U.N.T.S. at 212, 214, 216; see generally
GARY HUFBAKER &JOANNA SHELTON ERB, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 19-24
(1984) (focusing on injury to importing country as a basis to regulate imports).
53. See Charnovitz, supra note 42, at 74; Mandel, supra note 39, at 454.
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bor."54 A subsidy given to exported merchandise is unfair because it
represents an injury-causing deviation from the natural rules for effi-
cient, competitive markets. 55 An action to offset a subsidy, such as
the imposition of import duties, merely corrects the deviation from
market principles. This type of correction only raises the lower
prices on imports to what they would have been if the foreign pro-
ducer had been operating under normal conditions of competitive
markets undistorted by government.56 It does nothing, however, to
ameliorate the underlying cause of the low-price goods.
B. U.S. Initiatives to Link Labor Conditions to Trade
In addition to support under international trade norms, recent
U.S. actions establish a precedent for predicating access to the U.S.
market on respect for worker rights. In the last decade, the U.S.
Congress has added worker rights provisions into four pieces of
trade-related legislation:57 The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI),58
the 1984 Amendments to the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP),59 the 1985 Amendments to the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation Act (OPIC),60 and the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA).61
The CBI and the GSP provide duty-free entry into the United
States for eligible products from developing countries on a
nonreciprocal basis.62 Both acts offer duty-free access in exchange
54. Mandel, supra note 39, at 454; see also Charnovitz, supra note 42, at 74.
55. See Tarullo, supra note 26, at 549.
56. Id.
57. See Ian Charles Ballon, The Implications of Making the Denial of Internationally
Recognized Worker Rights Actionable Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1979, 28 VA. J.
INT'L L. 73, 75 (1987). Congress also passed a fifth piece of legislation: The Compre-
hensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986),
amended by Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986: Corrections, Pub. L. No. 99-
631, 100 Stat. 3515 (1986) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (1988)). This law
was designed to promote social change by conditioning the operation of U.S. compa-
nies in South Africa on their having respect for human rights and labor rights. See S.
REP. No. 370, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2334, 2335.
This Note addresses only legislation which restricts access to the U.S. market and thus
the Anti-Apartheid Act is not discussed.
58. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1988)).
59. Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573,
98 Stat. 3018 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2466 (1988).
60. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-204, § 5, 99 Stat. 1669, 1670 (1985) (codified in scattered sections of 22
U.S.C. (Supp. III 1985).
61. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA), Pub. L. No.
100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
62. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2461(1) (1988).
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for, among other conditions, respect for worker rights. 63 Addition-
ally, both acts permit the U.S. President to terminate a country's ben-
eficiary status64 if a country violates certain basic worker rights. 65
The CBI conditions beneficiary status on "the degree to which
workers in [the] country are afforded reasonable work place condi-
tions and enjoy the right to organize and bargain collectively."66
This provision of the CBI is a nonbinding criterion which allows, but
does not require, violations to be the basis for terminating a coun-
try's beneficiary status. 67 According to one commentator, the CBI
worker rights provision puts CBI beneficiary countries on notice that
the United States expects them to respect worker rights. In terms of
legal effect, however, the provision is almost meaningless.68
The GSP, however, is more legally consequential. Its worker
rights provision states that no country may be designated by the
President as a beneficiary if the country "has not taken or is not tak-
ing steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights to work-
ers in the country." 69 The GSP defines "internationally recognized
worker rights" to include: (i) the right of association;70 (ii) the right
63. Id. §§ 2462(b)-(c), 2702(b), 2702(c)(1)-(11).
64. "Beneficiary country" status allows a nation to receive favorable tariff treat-
ment. The President designates a country to receive beneficiary country status based
on various factors such as the nation's own desire to be so designated, its level of
economic development, its tariff and export policies, its commitment to reducing
barriers to trade, and its recognition of internationally acknowledged worker rights.
See id. §§ 2461, 2462(c), 2701, 2702(c) (1988).
65. Id. §§ 2464(b), 2702(c).
66. Id. § 2702(c)(8).
67. Id. § 2702(c).
68. See Ballon, supra note 57, at 77.
69. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7) (1988); see also SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RElATIONS
& HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
TICES FOR 1986, app. B, 1346-47 (1986) (Joint Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter
COUNTRY REPORTS] (defining the rights which are specified as "internationally recog-
nized worker rights" in U.S. legislation).
70. The International Labor Organization (ILO) defines the right of association
to include the following rights of workers and employers: (1) to establish and join
organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization, (2) to draw up
their own constitutions and rules, (3) to elect their own representatives, (4) to formu-
late their own programs, (5) to join in confederations and affiliate with international
organizations, and (6) to be protected against dissolution or suspension by adminis-
trative authority. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 69, at 1346. The State Department
further notes:
Freedom of association is not synonymous with the right of workers to
strike, as strikes may be curtailed in essential services (i.e., those services
whose interruption would endanger the life, personal safety, or health of a
significant portion of the population) and in the public sector. Such restric-
tions, however, must be offset by adequate guarantees to safeguard the in-
terests of the workers concerned (e.g., machinery for mediation and
arbitration; due process; and the right to judicial review of all legal actions).
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to organize and bargain collectively; 71 (iii) a prohibition on the use
of any form of forced or compulsory labor;72 (iv) a minimum age for
the employment of children;73 and (v) acceptable conditions at work
with respect to minimum wages, work hours, and occupational safety
and health. 74 An important component of the GSP is its grant of a
worker rights review process to be administered by the office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR).75 The USTR reviews
whether GSP beneficiary countries are violating worker rights. 76
The USTR permits any interested party7 7 to initiate and participate
in the review process. 78
The OPIC legislation, like the CBI and the GSP, similarly ties
worker rights to U.S. trade policy. 79 OPIC is a federally chartered
and operated corporation which provides insurance and financing
for private investment in developing countries. 80 The 1985 amend-
ments to the OPIC legislation require that insurance and financing
71. The State Department's definition of this right includes "the right of workers
to be represented in negotiating the prevention and settlement of disputes with em-
ployers; the right to protection against interference; and the right to protection
against acts of anti-union discrimination. Governments should promote machinery
for voluntary negotiations between employers and workers and their organizations."
Id.
72. Forced or compulsory labor is defined as work or service exacted from
any person under the menace of penalty and for which the person has not
volunteered. (It should be noted that the ILO has specifically exempted the
following from its definition of forced labor: compulsory military service;
certain civil obligations; certain forms of prison labor; work exacted in emer-
gencies; minor communal services).
Id. at 1346-47.
73. "'Minimum age' concerns the effective abolition of child labor by raising the
minimum age for employment to a level consistent with the fullest physical and
mental development of young people. In addition, young people should not be em-
ployed in hazardous conditions or at night." Id. at 1347.
74. "Acceptable conditions of work" refers to the establishment and main-
tenance of machinery, adapted to national conditions, that provides for min-
imum working standards, i.e., wages that provide a decent living for the
workers and their families; working hours that do hot exceed 48 hours per
week, with a full 24-hour rest day; a specified annual paid holiday; and mini-
mum conditions for the protection of the safety and health of workers.
Id. at 1347.
75. 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c) (1988). Worker rights is one factor the United States
uses in reviewing eligibility for preferential treatment.
76. 15 C.F.R. § 2007.8(b)(ix)(B)(x) (1991).
77. The regulation defines an interested party as one who has a "significant eco-
nomic interest" in the subject of the request for review, or any party representing a
"significant economic interest" that would be "materially affected" by the action re-
quested. 15 C.F.R. § 2007.0(d) (1991).
78. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 2007.0-2007.8 (1991).
79. See Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1985, 22
U.S.C. § 2191 (1988).




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss2/8
FREE TRADE AND AMERICAN WORKERS
be denied to U.S. companies investing in countries that are not "tak-
ing steps to adopt and implement laws that extend internationally
recognized worker rights as defined in" the GSP.81 In the OPIC leg-
islation, Congress directed the USTR to evaluate a country's compli-
ance with the "taking steps" mandate by looking at whether a
country is a signatory to the International Labor Organization (ILO)
charter, has laws that parallel the GSP list of internationally recog-
nized worker rights, and continues to make progress toward imple-
menting these rights.82
In 1988, Congress passed the OTCA legislation, which is signifi-
cantly broader than the OPIC, the CBI, or the GSP. The OTCA
amends section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,83 and conditions all
international trade with the United States on a country's respect for
worker rights.84 Section 301 provides a mechanism for the USTR,85
on behalf of the U.S. government, to take unilateral measures against
an act, policy, or practice of foreign governments or their instrumen-
talities which adversely affect U.S. trade.86 Section 301 authorizes
the USTR to take all "appropriate and feasible action" against any
unreasonable or discriminatory act, policy, or practice that burdens
or restricts U.S. commerce. 87
The OTCA amends section 301 by expressly defining the denial of
internationally recognized worker rights as an unreasonable ("unfair
and inequitable")88 trade practice.89 Consequently, the USTR now
81. 22 U.S.C. § 2191a(a)(1) (1988).
82. Id. § 2411; see also H.R. REP. No. 285, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in
1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2577 (elaborating upon what constitutes "steps toward
providing worker rights").
83. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA), 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411 (1988) (amending Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1984)). While
the Trade Act of 1974 is codified in its most current form at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988),
commentators consistently refer to the enumerated sections of the act-e.g., "Sec-
tion 301"-rather than 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
84. Id. §§ 2411(a)(1)(B), 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii); see also H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 67 (1987) (stating that the objective of the provision is
establishment of basic worker rights and standards).
85. See 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988). "Interested persons" may initiate § 301 ac-
tions. An interested person includes, for example, domestic firms and workers, rep-
resentatives of consumer interests and companies that export U.S. products. Id.
§ 2411(d)(9); see also 15 C.F.R. § 2006(b) (1991) (providing a more specific list of
parties that may be considered "interested," including, for example, commercial ex-
porters and trade associations).
86. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1988).
87. Id. § 2411(b)(1), (2).
88. Id. § 241 l(d)(3)(A). Section 301 grants the USTR authority to bring a cause
of action involving "unreasonable" practices. The term "unreasonable" refers to a
practice that while "not necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent with, the interna-
tional legal right of the United States, is otherwise deemed to be unfair and inequita-
ble." Id. § 2411(d)(3)(B).
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has the explicit power to construe labor rights violations by any U.S.
trading partner as actionable under section 301.90 If the USTR de-
termines that a country is violating labor rights, the President can
impose economic sanctions9l through duties and import restric-
tions92 or call for negotiation over the violator's labor policies. 93
These four recent congressional initiatives, especially the OTCA,
lend strong support for the propriety of connecting trade to worker
rights. In the context of U.S.-Mexican trade, it is therefore appropri-
ate for economically interested parties in the United States to insist
that unrestricted access to the U.S. market be allowed only for Mexi-
can goods produced under nonexploitive workplace conditions. As a
result, U.S. firms would no longer have to compete with Mexican
traders possessing an ill-gotten advantage. Moreover, connecting
trade to labor rights furthers the goal of preventing American worker
dislocation.
IV. INCORPORATING WORKER RIGHTS INTO A NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
As a means of minimizing the harm that free trade with Mexico will
cause American workers, the United States can pursue two courses to
implement "worker rights conditionality." Worker rights condition-
ality refers to the practice of conditioning foreign access to a domes-
tic market on the observance of a defined set of worker rights.94 To
implement worker rights conditionality, the United States can pro-
89. Id. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii). The OTCA includes the following as unreasonable
trade practices:
any act, policy, or practice, or any combination of acts, policies, or practices
which ... constitutes a persistent pattern of conduct that
(I) denies workers the right of association,
(II) denies workers the right to organize and bargain collectively,
(III) permits any form of forced or compulsory labor,
(IV) fails to provide a minimum age for the employment of children, or
(V) fails to provide standards for minimum wages, hours of work, and oc-
cupational safety and health of workers.
Id.
90. Id. § 2412(a). The term "actionable" refers to the ability to file a petition
with the office of the USTR for rights violations. Formal dispute resolution occurs
only after that office accepts the petition and attempts an informal resolution with the
foreign country charged with the violation, or when the USTR office initiates a sec-
tion 301 investigation. Id.
91. Id. § 2411(a)(1), (b)(2).
92. Id. § 2411(c).
93. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 62 (1987). Retaliation
in the form of duties and import restrictions is not the preferred method for dealing
with trading partner labor rights violations. The preferred approach is to work with
the trading partner to "eliminate or phase-out" the illegal practices. Id.
94. Amato, supra note 37, at 83.
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ceed unilaterally, taking action against Mexico,95 or it can proceed
bilaterally, in a cooperative effort with Mexico.96
The OTCA provides the United States, or an economically inter-
ested private party, with a unilateral mechanism under section 301
for implementing labor rights conditionality on Mexican imports.
This unilateral approach is open to criticism on the grounds that it is
too political, largely ineffective, and inconsistent with the principles
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).97 A bilat-
eral approach, through a joint U.S.-Mexican mechanism to imple-
ment worker rights conditionality, can avoid these criticisms.98
Consequently, a bilateral mechanism has more potential than the
present unilateral mechanism for preventing harm to American
workers. Current free trade negotiations between the United States
and Mexico99 offer an attractive opportunity to address worker rights
with the aim of preventing harm to American workers.
A. Criticisms of Unilateral U.S. Action under Section 301
The first criticism of section 301 concerns the discretionary power
it gives to the executive branch.10o The USTR, acting for the Presi-
dent, has unrestrained discretion to decide whether to initiate an in-
vestigation of an interested party's claim of worker rights
violations.101 If the USTR decides to investigate a claim, the deci-
sion whether to impose sanctions also is discretionary.102 Further-
more, the USTR's section 301 determinations are not judicially
reviewable.O3 Consequently, the enforcement of worker rights vio-
lations rests upon the executive branch's willingness to sanction a
particular worker rights violator. 104 One commentator suggests that
the discretion given to the USTR and the President makes section
301 decisions "overtly political."105 Worker rights violators may es-
cape or be subject to sanctions, depending solely on political impli-
95. See 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(c)(l)(A), 241 1(c)(l)(B) (1988) (discussing generally the
unilateral means for the United States to implement worker rights conditionality).
96. See Chamovitz, supra note 42, at 75 (discussing generally the implementation
of labor rights conditionality in a cooperative multilateral fashion).
97. See infra part IV.A.
98. See infra part IV.B.
99. See GIST, supra note 13.
100. See Ballon, supra note 57, at 120; Bart S. Fisher & Ralph G. Steinhardt, III,
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protection for U.S. Exporters of Goods, Services and
Capital, 14 LAw & POL'Y Irr'L Bus. 569, 578, 599 (1982); Amato, supra note 37, at
103; Mandel, supra note 39, at 468-72.
101. 15 C.F.R. §§ 2006.2, 2006.6(a) (1991); see also Amato, supra note 37, at 103.
102. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (b) (1988); see also Mandel, supra note 39, at 468.
103. See Mandel, supra note 39, at 468.
104. See Amato, supra note 37, at 103; Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 100, at 599.
105. See Mandel, supra note 39, at 468.
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cations.106 In sum, the OTCA unilateral mechanism may subvert
claims because it does not preclude political motivations from affect-
ing the decision of whether to pursue a claim of worker rights
violations.
A second criticism of section 301 is its questionable effectiveness
in relieving the harm that foreign worker rights violations cause to
U.S. firms. Two aspects of the section 301 mechanism hinder its ef-
fectiveness as a preventive tool. First, an action to alleviate harm
takes time. The USTR has forty-five days to determine whether to
initiate an investigation.lO7 If an investigation is initiated, the USTR
must request consultations with the foreign country on the issues in-
volved.1o8 The USTR may delay this request for up to ninety days in
order to verify or improve the petition.109 The USTR has thirty days
after the dispute settlement concludes, or eighteen months after the
investigation is initiated, to make a recommendation to the Presi-
dent, I 1o who then determines whether to take any action against the
violating country."II The time frame for obtaining relief under sec-
tion 301 thus allows a worker rights violator to maintain a competi-
tive advantage for a considerable length of time-more than a year
and a half. This time lag will undoubtedly cause substantial eco-
nomic hardships for those U.S. firms that must continue to compete
with worker rights violators until they receive relief.
Another hindrance to the effectiveness of the section 301 mecha-
nism is revealed by the congressional intent behind it. Section 301
was intentionally designed as a negotiating tool.112 Consistent with
this intent, sanctions under section 301 have rarely been imposed.l1
Instead, the USTR usually chooses negotiations as a means to deter
unfair trade practices. 1 14 Negotiations aimed at changing a foreign
country's trade policies are not likely, however, to produce any im-
106. See Amato, supra note 37, at 105; Mandel, supra note 39, at 468.
107. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.3 (1991).
108. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(1) (1988).
109. Id. § 2413(b).
110. Id. § 2414(a)(2); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.12 (1991).
111. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1), 2411(b)(2) (1988).
112. See Mandel, supra note 39, at 469; H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 57 (1987). "[Slection 301 is a negotiating tool .... The President may
impose retaliatory import measures or take any other actions under his constitutional
powers as negotiating leverage to obtain a satisfactory solution or as a last resort as
'self-compensation' to enforce U.S. rights." Id.
113. See Mandel, supra note 39, at 469; Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 100, app. at
A2-A12 (listing results of all section 301 cases prior to 1982); Alan F. Holmer &
Judith Bello, The 1988 Trade Bill: Is It Protectionist? 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1347,
1348-49 (Oct. 5, 1988) (discussing section 301 actions from 1986 to 1988).
114. See Mandel, supra note 39, at 469. The negotiation and other dispute resolu-
tion procedures are expressly mandated by section 301. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2411 (c)(l)(C), 2413(a)(1988)).
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mediate relief for U.S. firms harmed by unfair trading. This is espe-
cially true if worker rights violations are deeply entrenched in a
foreign country's political system." 5
The third major criticism of the section 301 unilateral mechanism
is that it offends two of the underlying principles of GATT. GATT is
"the centerpiece of [the] international trade order,"'16 which, by its
legal framework, regulates eighty percent of the world's trade.' 17
Multilateralism and nondiscrimination in trade are two of the funda-
mental tenets of the GATT trade order.' 18 The "multilateralism"
principle of GATT calls for trade agreements to be equally formed
and beneficial to all the states involved.' 19 The "nondiscriminatory"
principle of GATT requires that any governmental intervention in
trade accorded to one country be extended to all other countries.120
These two principles encompass GATT's purpose, which is to pro-
vide an internationally accepted system for governing international
trade.121 A section 301 action conditioning trade on worker rights
violates the multilateral spirit of GATT122 because the imposition of
sanctions is based on unilateral U.S.-defined worker rights, rather
than on worker rights standards arising from an international
consensus. 1 2 3
115. Id. at 468 n.133. In such a case, the USTR could reject an otherwise valid
petition where it concludes that imposing sanctions would be ineffective. Id.
116. Amato, supra note 37, at 88. This "international trade order" refers to the
free trade system initiated by the United States after World War II in order to obtain
freer access to foreign markets. Id. at 87.
117. Id.; see also KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 10 (1970).
118. Amato, supra note 37, at 88.
119. See id.; GATT, supra note 45, 61 Stat. at A-12, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196-98. GATT
signatories (members) are required to do the following: accord most-favored-nation
treatment to other members, observe the maximum tariff levels set by other mem-
bers' concession schedules, refrain from or minimize any nontariffbarriers, and com-
ply with recognized dispute-resolution procedures to adjudicate trade conflicts. JAN
KOLASA, LAw-MAKING AND LAw-ENFORCING FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE: SOME REFLEC-
TIONS ON THE GAT EXPERIENCE 2-10 (1976) (outlining privileges and obligations
accorded by GATT to signatory nations).
120. See Amato, supra note 37, at 88-89; GATT, supra note 45, 61 Star. at A-12, 55
U.N.T.S. at 196-98.
121. Amato, supra note 37, at 89. See also C. Michael Aho, The Uruguay Round. Will
it Revitalize the Trading System?, 11 FLETCHER FORUM 1, 4 (1987). The GATE system
reduces uncertainty, while expanding investment, trade, and growth on an interna-
tional level. Id.
122. Amato, supra note 37, at 104-25. But see Hickey, supra note 37, at 149. Hickey
argues that labor standards in U.S. trade legislation are based not on standards set by
the United States, but on International Labor Organization conventions, and should
therefore be viewed as multilateral in nature since these conventions have been
adapted by hundreds of countries around the world.
123. Amato, supra note 37, at 104-05. "If the United States sanctions a country for
violating United States-defined worker rights, and the offending country does not
19921
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An action under section 301 also violates the spirit of GATr be-
cause action under it is discretionary and therefore open to discrimi-
natory application.124 The USTR, acting for the President, retains
unfettered control over decisions whether or not to investigate
claims and impose sanctions.12 5 Under these circumstances, dis-
crimination would occur if the United States took action against po-
litically disfavored countries or industries which violate worker
- rights, while ignoring worker rights violations by politically favored
countries or industries.12 6 In addition, a country's cooperation with
labor rights investigations may paradoxically result in discriminatory
applications of sanctions against it. A private party, or the U.S. gov-
ernment, that petitions for action under section 301 against a foreign
country must base its claim on information about the nature of
worker rights violations in the foreign country.12 7 If the foreign
country denies access to labor rights investigators, it can insulate it-
self from the claim.128 However, an open country which allows in-
vestigators to gather information, is more likely to be subject to
charges of worker rights violations.129 The discrepancy in access to
information thus creates the potential for discrimination in the sec-
tion 301 petitioning process as well.' 3 0
B. Advantages of a Bilateral Mechanism to Implement Worker Rights
Conditionality
The difficulties created by unilateral implementation of worker
rights conditionality can be avoided under a bilateral approach. By
linking trade to worker rights in a cooperative manner, the bilateral
approach enables joint participation in both defining and enforcing
worker rights.131 It can, therefore, provide a means of implementing
worker rights conditionality that is less political, more effective and
consistent with GATT.132
The potential for politically motivated decisions can be reduced by
establishing a binational panel as the primary mechanism for investi-
gating and resolving labor-related trade disputes.SS Neither gov-
consider its trade practices 'unreasonable,' the United States risks retaliation under
GATT." Id. at 107.
124. Id. at 105.
125. See supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
126. Amato, supra note 37, at 105.
127. Id. at 108; 15 C.F.R. § 2006.1 (1991).
128. Amato, supra note 37, at 108.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Mandel, supra note 39, at 448 (discussing the benefits of a multilateral
system of international labor standards over a unilaterally dictated one).
132. Id.
133. Id. A U.S.-Mexican binational panel to resolve labor-related disputes could
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ernment would retain the politically manipulable discretion to decide
whether to take action on a claim of worker rights violations.tS14
A bilateral approach can also enhance the practical effectiveness of
obtaining relief for worker rights violations. Assuming that a bilat-
eral mechanism would provide for cooperation in the investigatory
process, the time frame for responding to a claim could be lessened,
reducing harm to firms competing with a worker rights violator. In
addition, a bilateral approach permits both countries to participate
initially in the development of worker rights or standards, thereby
creating a better climate for compliance.t35 This advantage is partic-
ularly valuable since compliance prevents labor rights violations
from occurring and prevents the economic harms which flow from
them.
Another advantage of a bilateral approach is its respect for GAIT
and the established norms of the international trading order. A bi-
lateral mechanism to implement labor rights conditionality could not
exist without the cooperative effort and consent of the parties who
create it. Bilateral participation in investigatory and adjudicative
procedures also reduces the potential for discriminatory treatment of
either country. ' 3 6
It thus follows that a U.S.-Mexico bilateral approach to curtail
worker rights violations offers the most promise to limit Mexico's
ability to utilize an "unfair" advantage. The United States should
be modeled after the U.S.-Canada binational anti-dumping and countervailing duty
dispute settlement panel. See Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2,
1988, 27 I.L.M. 281, 386-402 (1988). Chapter 19 of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement establishes a process using binational panels to review decisions by either
country to impose duties under their unfair trade laws. Id. art. 1904 and annex
1901.2, 27 I.L.M. at 387-390, 393-94. The two countries elect a five-member panel
from a roster of 50 candidates, each country selecting 25 qualified candidates:
Candidates shall be of good character, high standing and repute, and shall
be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability, sound judgment,
and general familiarity with international trade law. Candidates shall not be
affiliated with either party and in no event shall a candidate take instructions
from either party.... The parties shall maintain the roster, and may amend
it, when necessary after consultations.
Id. annex 1901.2 (1), 27 I.L.M. at 393.
Each panel must contain a majority of panelists who are lawyers in good stand-
ing. Id. annex 1901.2 (2), 27 I.L.M. at 393. When a panel is requested, each country
appoints two panelists, and the fifth panelist is selected jointly by the two countries or
the four appointed panelists. Id. annex 1901.2 (2) & (3), 27 I.L.M. at 393. If the
countries and the panelists cannot agree on a fifth panelist, "the panelist shall be
selected by lot ... from the roster..." of qualified candidates. Id. annex 1901.2 (3),
27 I.L.M. at 393.
134. Id.
135. See Charnovitz, supra note 42, at 75 (discussing proposition in the context of a
multilateral policy).
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therefore seek to establish a bilateral mechanism with Mexico to en-
sure that only goods produced in observance of worker rights are
allowed to cross the border unrestricted.
C. Establishing Free Trade and Fair Trade Simultaneously
The free trade negotiations between the United States and Mexico
provide an opportunity to establish a bilateral mechanism to imple-
ment worker rights conditionality. Considering the goal of prevent-
ing American worker dislocation, establishing this mechanism as a
part of the free trade agreement is desirable for two reasons. First,
American worker dislocation will be alleviated most effectively if pro-
tection from unfair trade is provided at the outset. If a U.S.-Mexico
free trade agreement does not address worker rights, the only re-
course against unfair trade is through the less effective section 301
action, at least until a separate worker rights agreement can be nego-
tiated. 13 7 Second, if a mechanism to address worker rights violations
is not included as part of a free trade agreement, it may be difficult
for the United States to persuade Mexico to address the issue in the
future. Commentators agree that Mexico has more to gain under
free trade than does the United States.' 3 8 The United States, there-
fore, has leverage to insist that worker rights conditionality be in-
cluded in NAFTA. If the United States misses the opportunity to
include a mechanism to link free trade to labor rights it loses this
bargaining power. Once free trade is in place, Mexico will have little
incentive to bargain away its labor advantage.
If the United States forgoes this opportunity to protect its workers
from unfair trade, the potential for harm to American workers from
free trade with Mexico will likely increase. The time to combat the
adverse effects of free trade is before NAFTA is in place.
V. CONCLUSION
The commitment of the United States and Mexico to negotiate a
free trade agreement has moved the two countries close to full eco-
nomic integration. This prospect presents opportunities for many
U.S. industries, and it is likely to benefit all Americans by lowering
consumer prices. The overall benefits of U.S.-Mexico economic inte-
gration are likely to come at a price, however. That price, many com-
mentators agree, is American jobs. Whether one hundred, one
thousand, or one million American jobs are lost, economic and social
hardship will result. The United States therefore should pursue a
137. The Bush Administration has indicated that it intends to address Mexican
working conditions through cooperative efforts with the Salinas Administration. See
Response, supra note 14, at 317.
138. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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strategy to minimize the potentially harmful consequences of free
trade on American workers. A preventive course must be taken.
Conditioning access to the U.S. market on worker rights is an appro-
priate means to prevent American worker dislocation.
While the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ex-
plicitly allows unfair trade claims based on suppression of worker
rights,13 9 this unilateral approach has shortcomings. A better way to
implement worker rights conditionality is through a U.S.-Mexico bi-
lateral process. Bilateral cooperation in establishing a set of recog-
nized worker rights and in enforcing those rights increases the
preventive capability of this mechanism. The best opportunity for
the United States and Mexico to establish a bilateral mechanism is
through the current free trade talks. If we miss this opportunity,
Mexico could take advantage of unfair practices and thereby injure
American workers.
Thomas R. Howard
139. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b), 2411(c), 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii) (1988).
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